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Tony Freyer 
During  the  formative  era of  managerial  capitalism,  changes in  legal  rules 
had  important  consequences for the evolution of  business  forms. Alfred D. 
Chandler,  Jr.,  and  Leslie  Hannah have  argued that  varying  policies  toward 
cartels in Britain and the United States help explain the different scale of the 
turn-of-the-century merger wave in the two nations. They also argued that di- 
verging  legal  rules help explain  why  managerial  capitalism  and large-scale 
corporations became the norm in America, whereas family capitalism contin- 
ued to characterize  the British business order. Neither Chandler nor Hannah 
based this argument on a close consideration  of the legal record, however.' 
This paper aims to provide  a legal foundation for their thesis by  surveying 
the development of  antitrust policy  in  the two nations over the period  1880 
to 1920.* 
First, I give an overview of the legal rules governing cartel practices during 
the formative period and then, in sections 6.2 and 6.3, I examine more closely 
the evolution of court decisions in Britain and the United States. It is notewor- 
thy that in Britain nearly all the cases were private suits involving the cartel 
practices of family firms or individually owned organizations.  In the United 
States, however, there was a mix of cases. Many were private suits challenging 
cartels, but the most important cases involved state or federal prosecution of 
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large  corporate  consolidations.  In section 6.4  I  suggest  more directly how 
changing legal rules influenced the economic behavior of managerially central- 
ized corporations, particularly holding companie~.~ 
6.1  Legal Rules Governing Cartels 
In discussing legal policies toward formal cartels and other cartellike re- 
straints of trade, it is useful to distinguish between unenforceability and crimi- 
nal liability. In Britain the gradual evolution of legal rules led the courts gener- 
ally to reject any form of criminal liability in cases involving restrictive trade 
practices and restraints. By the middle of  the nineteenth century Parliament 
had repealed statutes that made it an indictable offense to try to secure control 
of commodities en route to market in order to raise prices. Within a short time 
British courts had similarly modified the common law. By the  1890s, as we 
shall see, British judges fashioned a formal principle of nonintervention in the 
Mogul case and a rule of  reason in  the Nordenfelt  decision.  In  the  United 
States, however,  change  proceeded  largely  in  a contrary  direction.  By  the 
1880s and 1890s the number of trade restraints subject to criminal indictment 
had actually increased, facilitating the development of per se rules against such 
restraints.  During  the  same period,  moreover,  an  American  rule  of  reason 
emerged that further enlarged the ground for raising legal challenges to mo- 
nopolistic practices (Freyer 1992, esp. 121-58). 
In both Britain and America by the mid-nineteenth  century the enforceabil- 
ity of a contract in restraint of trade cases depended on whether the restraint 
was “partial”  or “total.” An agreement whereby a producer might sell to an- 
other the right to make something in a local community was a “partial”  re- 
straint which under certain circumstances was enforceable even though a mo- 
nopoly might result. A similar restrictive agreement, however, applying to all 
procedures was a total restraint and hence not enforceable. Courts applied the 
same principles  to various  price-fixing  agreements  (including  resale  price 
maintenance), refusal-to-deal cases, and boycotts. A related principle applica- 
ble to this test involved the idea of “public policy.” The courts would not en- 
force contracts found to be contrary to “public policy,” but that did not mean 
the contracts were criminal. Instead, unenforceability  meant that the courts 
treated such contracts “as if they had not been made at all,” even though the 
“parties have agreed” (Freyer 1992, 126). 
By the end of the nineteenth century, however, the decisions of American 
and British courts increasingly diverged. Take the case of horizontal restrictive 
agreements, whereby  one party agreed to sell out to another and establish a 
monopoly. In Britain not only did such agreements remain  free of  criminal 
3. Chandler 1977, 375; 1990,398; Hannah 1979; McCraw 1984, 67, suggest the importance of 
“enforceability” in understanding the cartevmerger issues, but again, the treatment is not exhaus- 
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liability, but by  the  1890s British judges began  to employ  a reasonableness 
standard that allowed certain of these agreements to be enforced, regardless of 
whether they were partial or total. At this time, British courts permitted, but 
still did not enforce, horizontal price-fixing agreements among potential com- 
petitors.  After  1900, however, even these restraints increasingly became en- 
forceable where British judges found them to be reasonable. By contrast, in 
America, horizontal restraints were generally unenforceable even under a rea- 
sonableness  standard.  More important,  such  agreements  increasingly  were 
found to be per se criminally illegal (Freyer 1992, esp. 76-140). 
Vertical price-fixing  agreements further suggest the contrast. Throughout 
the nineteenth century in both nations it was common for producers to impose 
upon retailers  contractual restraints that governed  the selling price.  In both 
nations these were generally accepted but not enforced by the courts. After the 
turn of the century, however, legal rules in the two nations again diverged. In 
Britain vertical price restraints increasingly were enforceable under the stan- 
dard of reasonableness. In the United States, however, such agreements were 
rarely if ever enforceable. Moreover, in the DK  Miles decision of 191  1, the U.S. 
Supreme Court held that vertical restraints were per  se illegal.  Although in 
later years the Court upheld a few exceptions, the per se policy remained domi- 
nant (Freyer 1992,20-35,  153, 157, 191-94). 
At issue in all of these cases were two fundamental forms of economic lib- 
erty: freedom of trade versus freedom of contract. Freedom of trade meant that 
individuals and firms should be free to enter into transactions without interfer- 
ence from the restrictive practices of  others. Freedom of contract meant that 
the law should force parties to adhere to contractual obligations. By the turn 
of  the century, British and American courts had come to balance these two 
freedoms in very different ways. Although the British courts had initially em- 
braced a noninterventionist policy, favoring competition  and refusing to en- 
force restraints that impeded it, over time they moved to enforce contracts that 
met their reasonableness tests. In the United States, the courts moved in pre- 
cisely the opposite direction, not only refusing to enforce restrictive contracts 
but increasingly finding them actionable as violations of criminal law. 
6.2  Evolution of British Laws 
The 1890s were a turning point in British law because it was then that the 
courts decided  the new  controlling  precedents.  A key  decision  was Mogul 
Steamship Co. v. McGregor Co. The case arose in 1888 between a conference 
of steamship companies engaged in the lucrative China tea trade and the Mogul 
Company, which sought to enter the same market. The shipping conference 
was an effectively  organized cartel system of private governance, permitting 
its members to allocate markets,  regulate prices, control entry, and enforce 
agreements through persuasion or, if necessary, intimidation. Briefly, the con- 
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that  it become  a cartel member as well,  the conference balked, whereupon 
Mogul threatened  to cut its rates low enough to “smash” its opponent. The 
conference responded by reducing rates to such a level that Mogul could not 
survive.  It was a straightforward case of  using predatory  pricing to destroy 
a competitor, The steamship company sued, arguing that the conference had 
conspired to prevent it from competing “fairly,” violating common-law rules 
forbidding conspiracies to enter into restrictive commercial contracts. In sev- 
eral lower and appellate rulings between 1888  and 1892,  British COU~~S,  includ- 
ing finally the House of Lords, held that the conference’s conduct was not ac- 
tionable  on grounds of  conspiracy  and therefore  not  forbidden  by  law.  The 
adverse publicity caused a short-term dissolution of the cartel, but soon there- 
after  it  was  reestablished  and continued to exist  throughout  the  twentieth 
~entury.~ 
The judges’ various  opinions in  the Mogul litigation  set out  the  British 
common-law  policy toward  restrictive agreements.  Lord Justice Edward Fry 
observed matter of factly, regarding what in American would very likely have 
been criminally indictable, that the “scheme of the conference was by means 
of competition in the near future to prevent competition in the remote future.” 
Judge Charles S.  C. Bowen concluded that “competition, however severe and 
egotistical, if unattended by circumstances of  dishonesty, intimidation, moles- 
tation, or such illegalities . . . give [sic]  rise to no cause of  action at common 
law. I myself should deem it to be a misfortune if courts attempted to prescribe 
to the business world how honest  and peaceable trade was to be carried on, 
adopting some standard of judicial ‘reasonableness,’ or of  ‘normal’ prices or 
‘fair freights’  to  which  commercial adventures,  otherwise  innocent,  were 
bound to conform” (61 L.T.R. 826, 827, 828, 829). 
The Mogul case also raised  the  issue of  enforceability.  On  the  point  of 
whether cartel agreements were enforceable between the conference members 
themselves, Lord Chancellor Halsbury pointed out that they were not. Some 
contracts in restraint of trade were void as contrary to “public policy,” Hals- 
bury said. And “contracts so tainted the law will not lend its aid to enforce. It 
treats them as if they had not been made at all,” even though the “parties have 
agreed.” Thus businessmen  could form anticompetitive,  restrictive combina- 
tions.  But  this  very  freedom also meant  that  they  had  little  legal recourse 
against those in the combination who decided that continued cooperation was 
no longer in their interest. Thus the conference’s victory in court did not pre- 
vent in the short-term the dissolution of the cartel itself (66 L.T.R. 4). 
The other main precedent of  the  189Os, the Maxim Nordenfelt Guns case, 
also involved the issue of  enforceability, but  with different results.  In  1888 
Swedish inventor and businessman Thorsten Nordenfelt sold for a considerable 
4. Mogul Steamship Co. v.  Mctiregor; Gow and Co., 59 L.T.R. 514 (1888); Mogul Steamship 
Co. v.  Metiregor; Guw and Co., 62 L.T.R. 820 (1889); Mogul Steamship Co. v. Metiregor; Cow 
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sum his arms-manufacturing  business to a new British firm, the Maxim Nor- 
denfelt  Guns and Ammunition Company.  In  the  sales  contract  Nordenfelt 
agreed not to manufacture anywhere in the world for twenty-five years various 
of the precision  weapons he had developed, leaving that market to the new 
company. The contract also permitted him to remain with the firm as a senior 
partner. Within a short time, however, Nordenfelt resigned and reentered the 
armaments business in Belgium with the very weapons that the Maxim Com- 
pany was selling. The firm sued in  1892, asking for an injunction to compel 
Nordenfelt to cease competing in accordance with his contract. He responded 
by arguing that the twenty-five-year proscription was an unreasonable restraint 
of trade. Although the trial court agreed, on appeal the House of Lords reversed 
in favor of Maxim.5 
On one level the question was simple: should the court enforce the contract 
with an injunction, or not enforce it because it was an agreement in restraint 
of trade and therefore void? But on another level the issue was complicated 
because, as the Mogul decision showed, late-nineteenth-century British courts 
generally interpreted freedom of contract to mean that the enforcement of re- 
strictive  agreements  was exceptional. Although  this particular case required 
only a relatively  minor adjustment  in  restraint-of-trade  rules  affecting  con- 
tracts, it raised the issue of  whether restraints  deemed reasonable  could be 
enforced. The “time for a new departure,” to be “authoritatively decided” had 
risen, said Lord Moms (1  894 A.C. 575),  and Lord Mcnaghten provided a pre- 
cise definition: “[Rlestraints of trade and interference with individual liberty 
of action may be justified by the special circumstances of a particular case. It 
is a sufficient justification, and indeed it’s the only justification if the restriction 
is reasonable-reasonable,  that is, in reference to the interests of the parties 
concerned  and reasonable  in reference  to the interests  of  the public”  (1894 
A.C. 565). 
Mcnaghten’s reasonableness standard facilitated the enforcement of restric- 
tive  agreements,  especially  in  light  of  Mogul.  Prior  to Nordenfelt,  British 
judges had at times, on the basis of particular facts and principles of a case, 
enforced  trade restraints.  Lacking a consistent  standard,  however,  such en- 
forcement was exceptional. As Mogul had shown, British courts were willing 
to allow what amounted to private enforcement mechanisms through  cartel 
arrangements. But since no coherent legal enforcement  standard existed, the 
courts’ approach to enforcement issues was ultimately ad hoc. What Mcnagh- 
ten did was to create a formal legal principle-the  rule of reasonableness- 
which through legal analysis of a case’s facts and policy considerations enabled 
the  judge  to  enforce  restrictive  agreements.  In  effect,  Mcnaghten’s  rule 
strengthened Mogul’s sanction of cartel practices by establishing a legal analy- 
5.  Maxim Nordenfelt Guns and Ammunition Co. v.  Nordenfelt, 67  L.T.R. 469 (1892);  Maxim 
Nordenfelt Guns and Ammunition Co.  v.  Nordenfelt, 68 L.T.R. 833 (1892); Nordenfelt v. Maxim 
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sis for determining  whether the courts would do what previously  had been 
generally left to private self-regulation. 
From the mid-1890s on, the British  courts worked within the Mogul and 
Nordenfelt  principles.  In  1900 a  case  arose  involving  vertical  price-fixing 
agreements between a manufacturer  of embrocations  for horses, cattle, and 
human use and wholesalers who sold it to retailers. The manufacturer, Elliman, 
Sons and Company, required  a wholesaler purchasing the product to sign a 
contract agreeing he would not sell it below a fixed price. The agreement also 
bound the wholesaler to procure a similar contract from any retailer buying the 
embrocation. Carrington and Son conveyed Elliman’s goods to a retailer but 
failed to make the required contract, whereupon the manufacturer sued Car- 
rington  in chancery, asking the court to enforce that provision  of  the price- 
fixing agreement. The court held that the agreement between the manufacturer 
and wholesaler was valid and enforceable (2  Ch. 275 [1901]). 
The courts also considered  vertical restraints derived from a patent  to be 
within the limits of  reasonableness and hence enforceable. The United Shoe 
Machinery Company (USMC) owned a patented technology used by many of 
the world’s manufacturers of boots and shoes. The American-based company 
used its monopoly to impose upon those leasing the technology certain tying 
agreements that restricted  or denied altogether the use of  other equipment. 
According to one of these vertical clauses, the British manufacturer, Somervell 
Brothers, contracted to use only the USMC’s machinery for twenty years. After 
three years, Somervell found elements of the technology uneconomical for the 
particular demands of its business and began using other machinery. In 1906 
USMC sued for breach of contract and asked the chancery court to enforce it. 
Somervell responded that the tying agreement was a restraint of trade and con- 
trary to public policy. The judge admitted that he was “rather startled” at the 
“very considerable time” for which the contract ran. But, he said, “there it is, 
and we have got to make the best of it as it stands.” The ground “for discontinu- 
ing the machine-namely,  reasons of economy-is  wholly insufficient,” the 
judge concluded, and so there was “a breach of the contract,” which must be 
corrected by the court requiring enforcement.‘j 
An appeal from Canada revealed that the House of Lords was also willing to 
enforce such tying agreements. In order to complete part of its manufacturing 
process, Brunet, a Quebec firm, began using equipment produced locally  in 
violation  of its lease with USMC.  In  1905 the company  sued, arguing that 
Brunet had  violated  the “tying clause” of the lease. A special jury of local 
Quebec businessmen decided in favor of Brunet’s claim that the vertical con- 
straint was a restraint of trade and therefore void. Canada’s highest court up- 
held the verdict, whereupon in 1909 USMC appealed to the Judicial Commit- 
6.  Brirish United Shoe Machinery Co. Ltd. v. Somewell Bros., 95 L.T.R. (Ch.) 71  1, 713, 714 
(1907). BUSM was a subsidiary of the American company. See U.S.  v.  UniredShoe Manufucruring 
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tee. Unanimously following Mogul, the Lords’ Judicial Committee overruled 
the Canadian courts’ opinions.’ 
Even where the Australian legislature acted to outlaw self-regulating, anti- 
competitive agreements, the Lords found reasons to support them, In  1906 the 
new commonwealth’s parliament passed a federal law not unlike the Sherman 
Antitrust Act. It declared illegal any contract or combination the intent of 
which was “to destroy or injure by means of unfair competition any Australian 
industry which is advantageous to the commonwealth. . . . [and] the interests 
of producers, workers, and consumers.” Provincial coal companies formed a 
pool designed to fix prices, distribute output among members, and provide a 
fund supporting weak producers. The resulting stability enabled the colliers to 
establish a cartel agreement with several shipping companies to further control 
prices. The record showed that the agreements sought to ameliorate cut-throat 
competition, which had not only weakened the coal producers themselves but 
had also engendered labor strife because of  low wages and unemployment. 
Nevertheless, in the Adelaide Steamship case the Australian government chal- 
lenged the cartel as a violation of the nation’s antitrust law. Australia’s highest 
tribunal overruled the trial court’s decision, which favored the government, 
whereupon, in 1913, the attorney general appealed to the Lords’ Judicial Com- 
mittee.* 
The Lords interpreted the statute in light of  the principles established in 
Mogul and Nordenfelt. They rejected the argument that the Australian parlia- 
ment had intended all contracts in restraint of trade to be either void or unen- 
forceable, because such a holding threatened the existence of  “trade unions, 
the economic advantage of which has often been recognized in modem legisla- 
tion.” It also denied claims that U.S.  decisions based on the Sherman Act were 
relevant, rejecting the Supreme Court’s use of the rule of reason in the Standard 
Oil decision of  19  I 1. More significantly, the Judicial Committee linked the 
price stability the cartel agreements facilitated to the colliers’ ability to employ 
workers and pay  satisfactory wages, an outcome “eminently reasonable and 
well  calculated to  prevent  labor troubles.”  The  court held  that  the  cartel 
agreements raised no “legitimate inference that any of the parties concerned, 
whether colliery proprietors or shipping companies, acted otherwise than with 
a single view to their own advantage, or had any intention of raising prices or 
annihilating competition to the detriment of the public.” Thus, the court de- 
clared that the cartel practices were permissible under the law (1913 A.C. 800, 
801, 802, 810, 813). 
By  early  1914  the  judiciary’s  willingness  to  enforce  anticompetitive 
agreements was  clear. Most of  the  salt manufacturers in  western  England 
formed a cartel known as the North Western Salt Company for the “purpose of 
7. USMC of  Canada v. Brunet, 1909 A.C. 330. 
8. Attorney-General of  the Commonwealth ofAustralia v. the Adelaide Steamship Co. Ltd., 1913 
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regulating  supply and keeping  up prices, and it had the practical control of 
the inland salt market.” The Electrolytic Alkali Company, though not a cartel 
member, entered into a contract with North Western, limiting output and agree- 
ing to sell to no one else for a period of four years. In return the cartel guaran- 
teed the annual purchase of Alkali’s production  at a fixed price. Despite the 
agreement the company sold to a third party, whereupon North Western sued 
for breech of  contract, asking the court to compel compliance. Alkali argued 
in defense that the contract was void as a restraint of  trade and therefore not 
enforceable. Although the trial judge decided in favor of the cartel, the Court 
of Appeal reversed by  a vote of two to one. For final review the case went to 
the House of Lords.9 
The Lords reversed the appellate court’s decision, thereby not only permit- 
ting but also enforcing the restrictive agreements. As was true of the Australian 
antitrust case decided the year before, the court linked social order and busi- 
ness necessity. All four lords wrote opinions, but Haldane’s was representative. 
“Unquestionably,” he conceded, the purpose of the cartel was to “regulate sup- 
ply and keep up prices. But an ill-regulated supply and unremunerative prices 
may, in point of  fact, be disadvantageous to the public. Such a state of  things 
may, if it is not controlled, drive manufacturers out of business, or lower wages, 
and so cause unemployment and labor disturbance.” Accordingly, it “must al- 
ways be a question of circumstances whether a combination of  manufacturers 
in a particular trade is an evil from a public point of view. The same thing is 
true of  a supposed monopoly.”  Haldane concluded  that the parties were the 
“best judges of  what is reasonable  as between  themselves.”  As a result, the 
“detailed provisions” of the agreement at issue embodied primarily the “ma- 
chinery for working out the bargain.” The contract between the cartel and Al- 
kali was therefore neither illegal nor contrary to the public interest, and Alkali 
was bound to honor it (1914, A.C. 469,471). 
6.3  Evolution of U.S. Laws 
Although its legal phraseology was similar to Mcnaghten’s Nordenfelt opin- 
ion, the  rule  of  reason  articulated  by  U.S.  Supreme Court Justice  Edward 
White in the Standard Oil and American Tobacco decisions had very different 
implications. Most significantly, the American version of the rule applied the 
reasonableness standard only to tight combinations-that  is, combinations that 
took the form of mergers. In sharp contrast to British practice, the U.S. Su- 
preme Court declared cartels to be illegal per se, regardless of their reason- 
ableness. 
The different implications  of these rules of reason reflected  the divergent 
trends in the way courts in the two nations had handled restraint-of-trade cases 
9.  North Western Salt Co. Ltd. v. E/ectro/yticAlkali Co.. Ltd., 3 K.B. 422 (1913);  North Westeni 
Salt Co. Ltd.  v.  Electrolvtic Alkuli GJ.,  1914 A.C. 46. 191  Legal Restraints on Economic Coordination 
in the late nineteenth century. In the United States, for example, courts in the 
individual  states generally disposed of  private suits in a way  unfavorable  to 
cartels. An Alabama decision in  1900, Tuscaloosa Ice Mgf  Co.  v.  Williams, 
was typical. One of two ice manufacturers in Tuscaloosa contracted to sell his 
business to the other firm, which then possessed a monopoly. Wanting to re- 
enter business, the plaintiff (named in the report only as “Williams”) sued the 
Tuscaloosa Ice Company, arguing that the contractual agreement under which 
he sold his business  to his former competitor  was void under common-law 
rules  prohibiting  contracts  in  restraint  of  trade. The plaintiff  won  at  trial, 
whereupon the Tuscaloosa Ice Company appealed. The issue was whether a 
contract between  the two ice manufacturers,  in which one party granted the 
other a monopoly, was unlawful under the common law. The court found that 
the contract was a “vicious restraint of trade, and is therefore violative of the 
public policy of the state and void” (28 So. Rep. 669, 670 [Alabama, 19001). 
The circumstances of the case were similar to Nordenfelt, but the Alabama 
court did not apply the Nordenfelt principle of reasonableness to enforce the 
anticompetitive agreement. There was no doubt that the contract “tends to in- 
jure the public by stifling competition and creating a monopoly,” the court said, 
giving one company the power “to arbitrarily fix prices,” thereby creating a 
“partial ice famine, upon which [it] . . . could batten and fatten at its own sweet 
will.” Resorting to colorful language, the court observed that any defense of 
such practices  was “exceedingly  nude and bald.”  Yet, though the unfettered 
manufacture  of  ice in and of  itself  was undoubtedly  important  to the small 
town of Tuscaloosa during the hot, humid summer months, when the case was 
decided, the court stressed further considerations  it apparently  regarded  as 
equally compelling. Because of the contract to shut down one of two firms, 
the “public loses a wealth producing instrumentality. Labor is thrown out of 
employment.” This in turn forced workers upon the public welfare or drove 
them to become criminals. Hence, profits from a contract that established  a 
monopoly  were not the “just reward” of “skill and energy and enterprise  in 
building up a business,” but “a mere bribery and seduction of.  . .  industry, and 
a pensioning  of  idleness.”  The “motives actuating  such a transaction”  were 
“always . . . sinister and baleful.”’O 
Other cases similar to British precedents also yielded different results. The 
shipping conference at issue in Mogul was similar, for example, to the pipe 
manufacturers’ cartel challenged in the federal government’s famous Addyston 
Pipe suit, involving an attempt to control the manufacture and distribution of 
pipes throughout the Midwest and upper South. On their face the two cases 
seemed quite different. In Mogul the formal issue was whether the conference’s 
predatory pricing was criminally culpable. The formal issue raised in Addyston 
Pipe, by  contrast, was whether the cartel’s allocation of market territory and 
determination of “fair” prices among its members violated the Sherman Anti- 
10. 28 So. Rep. 672-73  (Alabama, 1900). Compare discussion of Nordenfelt above. 192  Tony Freyer 
trust Act. Consistent with other cartel decisions, the courts held the pipe manu- 
facturers’ cartel to be criminally illegal. But the underlying issue common to 
both  cases was whether the courts would indirectly sanction self-regulatory 
systems of private enforcement. The British courts, of course, did permit and 
therefore indirectly approved such private self-regulation, which in turn paved 
the way  for judicial  enforcement of  restrictive  agreements once Mcnaghten’s 
rule  of  reasonableness  was  established.  In  Addyston Pipe  and  other  cartel 
cases, however, the American judiciary consistently not only refused to enforce 
private self-regulatory  systems, but held them to be violations of the criminal 
law. Addyston Pipe was thus indicative of an emerging per se rule against car- 
tel practices. 
In the United States private actions were more numerous and probably more 
important than the suits initiated by the states’ attorneys general. In the private 
suits, like the public ones, a per se rule against cartel practices increasingly 
emerged. From every jurisdiction for all the years up to the 1870s there were 
perhaps no more than  130 recorded private suits challenging restrictive trade 
practices. Between 1880 and  1914 however, the number rose from 70 to 200, 
totaling 520 (May 1987, 503). Hans Thorelli concluded that this private litiga- 
tion “was one of the prime factors preventing the lapse of American industry 
into general cartelization of.  . . the contemporary German type” (1955, 266). 
The Tuscaloosa Ice  Co.  case was indicative of  the states’ refusal to enforce 
restrictive agreements. 
The law’s repudiation of enforceability throughout the states in turn com- 
pelled commercial lawyers to look for tighter organizational structures permit- 
ting more centralized command and control. One important solution, devised 
by Standard Oil’s lawyer S. T. C. Dodd, was the trust device, whereby individu- 
als surrendered their right of private enforcement to a central board, which 
established its own policies. Under Dodd’s trust, previously  separate owners 
of firms within Rockefeller’s cartel structure turned over trust certificates to the 
executive board; these certificates  surrendered control because they were le- 
gally  enforceable,  contractual  obligations.  The use  of  such  certificates  to 
achieve  greater centralized  control  was,  however, new,  so Dodd hoped  the 
courts might sanction them (Freyer 1992,32, 84-88). 
During the  1880s other corporate giants followed Standard Oil’s lead and 
replaced horizontal cartel arrangements, often with trusts and then eventually 
a holding company. Between the mid- 1880s and mid- 1890s, however, the attor- 
neys general of Louisiana, Illinois, Nebraska, California, New York, Ohio, and 
other states won from their courts decrees dissolving trusts. They secured these 
actions on the basis of  new legislation and court decisions that made loose 
corporate arrangements not only unenforceable, but also subject to civil and 
criminal prosecution. Essentially, the states enacted legislation and state courts 
employed interpretations formally removing from local law common-law prin- 
ciples of the sort that the Tuscaloosa Ice  Company had used as a defense and 
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practices in Nordenfelt and other decisions. In altering their common law the 
states thus established a more stringent policy toward restrictive practices than 
that sanctioned by  the reasonableness standard of Nordenfelt. Meanwhile, in 
1889 New Jersey enacted a law permitting corporations to form holding com- 
panies, and soon other states followed suit. As a result, when Ohio finally dis- 
solved the Standard Oil Trust, the company was able to avoid destruction by 
reconstituting itself as a holding company. The other trusts followed a similar 
strategy, until  such giants as American Sugar, American  Tobacco, the meat- 
packing industry, and even firms such as Du Pont and U.S. Steel, which had 
never been trusts, all adopted the holding company (May 1987; Thorelli 1955; 
McCurdy 1979). 
In certain instances improved  organizational  efficiency  enabled the more 
managerially centralized corporations to integrate vertically, taking over mar- 
keting and production operations that previously had been handled by indepen- 
dent operators. In other cases increased managerial centralization may have not 
resulted in the actual takeover of independents; enough organizational control 
nevertheless resulted so that corporate giants could use their market power to 
dominate  middlemen  and other  small businesses.  The competitors  that  the 
large firms absorbed through horizontal mergers also often were smaller busi- 
nesses. During the great turn-of-the-century merger wave, which primarily in- 
volved horizontal combination,  many smaller firms lost their independence, 
providing  yet  another  source of discontent  and demand  for political action 
against the trusts. 
The early stages of  this conflict encouraged passage of the Sherman Anti- 
trust Act; the persistence of struggle influenced the act’s subsequent applica- 
tion. The act made illegal every trade restraint and monopoly, though the actual 
meaning of these words was left to the federal courts and for some years there 
was considerable disagreement. Interestingly, most of the lower federal tribu- 
nals construed the Sherman Act much as had the Lords’ Judicial Committee 
in the Australian antitrust case-that  is, quite narrowly. In most of these deci- 
sions federal judges displayed a preference for interpreting the act according 
to British rather than American precedents. An original purpose for creating 
the federal judiciary under the Constitution was to provide a forum capable of 
enforcing uniform rules amid diverse state laws. Accordingly, faced with the 
confusing pattern  of  state anticartel decisions, on the one hand, and liberal 
holding-company  laws, on the other, it was not surprising that federal judges 
looked for guidance to the record of consistent precedents British courts pro- 
vided. Once the Supreme Court began reviewing the lower courts and made 
its own construction of  the Sherman Act, however, the adherence to British 
precedents generally ceased (see Letwin 1981, 148-49;  Freyer 1979). 
When the Supreme Court first construed  the  Sherman Act in the Knight 
Sugar Trust case of 1895, it interpreted the act’s provisions as prohibiting only 
contracts and combinations in restraint of interstate trade. Upholding state con- 
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ity held that the act applied only to restrictive practices involved directly in 
interstate trade, not to horizontal agreements among manufacturers involved 
in production within a single state. The Sugar Trust was a holding company 
whose production was confined principally to one state, Pennsylvania. Because 
such corporations were traditionally subject to state regulation, the Court de- 
cided, with only Justice John M. Harlan dissenting, that the Sherman Act did 
not reach them. The Knight decision seemed to signal that tight combinations 
would not be broken up under the Sherman Act.” 
In  U.S. v.  Trans-Missouri Freight Association (1897), the Court strength- 
ened the businessman’s preference for tight over loose corporate combinations. 
The issue was whether a cartel agreement among competing railroads to fix 
rates violated the Sherman Act. The lower federal court had applied the British 
reasonableness standard to sustain the agreement. The Supreme Court divided 
five to four, reversing the lower court. For the majority, Justice Rufus W.  Peck- 
ham held that the cartel’s rate-fixing practices violated the antitrust law. Peck- 
ham reasoned that the act should be read literally, without recourse to the ambi- 
guities of the common law, including the Mogul and Nordenfelt decisions, a 
result that was consistent with the general course of  anticartel decisions fol- 
lowed in the state courts. Justice White for the dissenters argued, however, that 
the more flexible rule of  reasonableness established in the British  cases and 
applied by the lower court should govern the application  of the Sherman Act 
(166 U.S. 290 [ 18961; Letwin 1981). 
Peckham, of  course, did not have the last word. By  1899 (the peak of the 
great merger wave) the Court suggested in several decisions, including most 
notably the sustaining of the result in Judge William H. Taft’s Addyston Pipe 
opinion, that common-law principles could provide guidelines for applying the 
Sherman Act. Yet  division among the justices persisted as to whether Peck- 
ham’s literal reading (and the state anticartel decisions it paralleled) or White’s 
rule of reason should govern the interpretation of the antitrust law.12 
A turning point was the Northern Securities case of  1903. Two major rail- 
roads formed a holding company specifically in order to avoid competing in 
interstate commerce. The Court held for the first time that such a tight corpo- 
rate combination was a violation of the Sherman Act. The five-to-four vote 
affirmed, however, the extent to which the justices remained divided. The ma- 
jority  supported Harlan’s decision that the preservation  of competition was a 
primary purpose of the Sherman Act. In so doing, the Court for the first time 
applied to a holding company the policy against restrictive practices underly- 
ing the state’s anticartel decisions. As one of the four dissenters, White argued 
that the evidence as to the intent of the act’s framers was too ambiguous to 
support Harlan’s interpretation. He also claimed that neither Peckham’s literal 
11. U.S. v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. I  (1895); McCurdy  1979. 
12. Addyston Pipe and Steel Co.  v.  U.S., 175 US. 211 (1899); U.S. v. Joint TrafJic Association, 
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reading nor Harlan’s emphasis upon a single policy favoring competition per- 
mitted the flexibility provided by the rule of reason. Given the uneven course 
of combined state and federal decisions since 1890, he asserted, flexibility was 
essential. By this point White was ready to apply a per se rule against cartels, 
but he remained adamant that a rule of reason should govern various forms of 
mergers. Moreover, in what became a famous dissent, Holmes categorically 
rejected  Harlan’s  expressed preference  for unrestrained  competition.  By  fa- 
voring the values of self-regulating cooperation, Holmes revealed a sympathy 
for the theoretical approach and substantive results of British law (193 U.S. 
197 [1903]). 
White’s point of view ultimately won out, and in the Standard Oil and Amer- 
ican Tobacco cases his dissent in Trans-Missouri Freight Association became 
the basis for a fundamental principle of  antitrust law. Both Standard Oil and 
American Tobacco were giant holding companies doing business throughout 
the United States and around the world. Both firms had entered into anticom- 
petitive  contracts  involving discriminatory  pricing  and marketing practices, 
which they defended on grounds of efficiency. White relied upon a reading of 
British and American common  law  to decide whether these contracts were 
lawful; though consistent with the contrast noted above, his formulation had a 
different substantive content from that established in Nordenfelt. He acknowl- 
edged that “freedom of contract” was the “rule in English law,” but that under 
the Sherman Act freedom to contract was the “essence of freedom from the 
undue restraint  of  the  right to contract.” Undue  restraint  arose, White said, 
from “pernicious conduct or acts” which “operated to the prejudice of the pub- 
lic interests by unduly restricting competition . .  . or which, either because of 
their inherent nature or effect or because of the evident purpose of the acts . . . 
injuriously restrained trade.” White’s emphasis upon undesirable consequences 
resulting from pernicious conduct established a legal standard permitting con- 
siderable flexibility. If the Court discovered offensive behavior that produced 
restrictive results, it was contrary to the public interest and unlawful. Accord- 
ingly, in the Standard Oil  case the Court found that the corporation had en- 
gaged in wrongful predatory pricing practices and therefore ordered the firm’s 
dissolution. The American Tobacco Company suffered a similar fate.I3 
Yet  White’s decisions of  19  11 also expressly acknowledged that in other 
cases the Court might find restraining conduct to be reasonable. In such cases, 
he said, the “words restraint of trade should be given a meaning which would 
not destroy the individual right to contract and render difficult if not impossible 
any movement of trade in the channels of interstate commerce-the  free move- 
ment of which it was the purpose of the [Sherman] statute to protect.” Essen- 
tially, White blended  economic fears of  market power  with  moralistic con- 
cerns, to hold that proof of predatory pricing practices, arbitrary allocation of 
market territories, and other conduct resulting from market domination were 
13. US.  b’.  StandardOil, 221 U.S.,56(1911); U.S. v. American  Tobacco, 221  US. 106(1911). 196  Tony Freyer 
“unreasonable” and therefore violated  the Sherman Act  (221 U.S.  106, 179 
[  191  11; see also Sklar 1988). 
The Court also strengthened further its opposition to cartels. In the same 
year the Court handed down the Standard Oil and American Tobacco opinions, 
the justices  reaffirmed  their  opposition to cartel practices by  declaring that 
vertical price-fixing agreements between manufacturers and their wholesalers 
or retailers were unlawful. The case, Dr Miles Medical Co. v. Park and Sons 
Co., did not involve the Sherman Act directly. The majority opinion noted in 
passing, however, that such practices were in principle contrary to the law (220 
U.S. 373 [1911]). 
Thus by  1911 the course of American antitrust law was apparent. Notwith- 
standing the early efforts of the lower federal courts and Justice White, the 
Supreme Court adopted and the federal government  enforced  the  anticartel 
policy  fostered by  the  state courts. Between  1890 and  1914 the  number of 
suits rose steadily, and in about 80 percent of these cases the government won. 
Significantly, six out of seven of the government’s prosecutions were of cartel 
agreements among comparatively  small enterprises  in the furniture, lumber, 
and apparel trades, both wholesale and retail. The government focused on these 
industries because it was easier to obtain testimony from customers and com- 
petitors providing unlawful conduct. Meanwhile, the court used the flexibility 
inherent in White’s rule of  reason generally to sanction large-scale corpora- 
tions such as U.S.  Steel, whose conduct was demonstrably neither  morally 
culpable  nor  economically  exploitive  of  competitors,  while  in  exceptional 
cases where “unreasonable” conduct was provable the court broke up tight 
corporate structures (McCraw 1984, 144-46;  Freyer 1992). 
6.4  Legislative Influence on Managerially Centralized Companies 
The contrast between the two nations in cartel law and in the construction 
of the rule of reason was paralleled by differences in the laws governing incor- 
poration.  Parliament had supported Britain’s free trade  spirit by enacting the 
“most liberal company law in Europe.” The Joint Stock Companies Act of 1844 
established the basic principles governing incorporation. The law defined the 
difference between private partnerships, which possessed  no limited liability, 
and joint stock companies, which did operate under that principle. The act 
also required corporations to accept the light of publicity through registration. 
Amendments passed in 1855 and 1856 and modest reforms in 1888 permitted 
“incorporation with limited liability to be obtained with a freedom amounting 
almost to license.” Increasingly after  1900, some major British firms formed 
holding companies in which a central or parent corporation owned the stock, 
rather than the actual properties, of the various constituent companies. Further 
changes in Britain’s company law encouraged tighter corporate concentration 
through merger. In 19  12 Parliament sanctioned the formation and registration 
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moneys received  from the members,”  which approved  investment  decisions 
permitting  the  attainment  of  greater control of  an  executive  board  through 
merger. With control concentrated in a smaller group, it was easier to form a 
tighter merger, though most British firms did not do so (Freyer 1992, 80, 81, 
178; see also Robson 1936). 
British incorporation law thus offered firms an attractive alternative to car- 
tels. Since cartels were not illegal, however, British firms continued to enter 
into various anticompetitive agreements in order to preserve those firms’ for- 
mal independence. Nonetheless, firms in certain industries chose tighter forms 
of  organization. In heavily capitalized industries such as iron and steel, for 
example, the tendency was toward a mixed industrial structure composed of “a 
comparatively  few large units in each branch,” which then combined into “a 
loose organization for the regulation of their trade” (Macrosty 1907, 82, 128- 
29). In other industries, such as textiles,  the trend toward merger facilitated 
effective enough forward integration into marketing that the survival of whole- 
salers was threatened. Most middlemen did not suffer this fate, however, be- 
cause  a primary  benefit  offered  by  British  law  was  greater  organizational 
choice and most firms preferred some sort of cartel structure. But market reali- 
ties clearly existed that led some firms to adopt the tighter corporate structure 
permitted under the holding-company act (Freyer 1992, 103). 
Various factors influenced  a firm’s decision to surrender its independence 
through some form of tight combination. Still, in Britain these factors did not 
include concerns about potential legal challenges to the new corporate entity. 
British judges applied the reasonableness standard so narrowly that the legal 
advantages  between  cartel  and  holding  company  or holding  company  and 
tighter  merger  were  limited.  In  America,  however, the  more  complete  the 
merger the greater was the likelihood that the firm would survive legal chal- 
lenge and, thereby, attain improved organizational efficiency (Bonbright and 
Means  1932; Chandler  1977, 499, 500; 1990, 288, 296, 303, 311, 312, 320, 
370, 379). 
Similarly,  in  Britain  only  the  parties  to  a restrictive  contract  could  sue, 
whereas in America any third party, including the government, even though 
not a party to the contract, possessed a cause of action. Reinforcing this differ- 
ence was the fact that in Britain there were no treble damages. In America, 
however, such damages were common in state cases and the norm in federal 
cases  (Freyer  1992). Thus,  as James C. Bonbright and Gardiner C. Means 
(1932) observed, American plaintiffs possessed incentives that did not exist in 
Britain to challenge restrictive practices. 
The absence of  an external threat  meant  that British firms could choose 
whether to organize their industry through cartels or holding companies. It also 
meant that, once a holding company had been formed, the decision whether to 
adopt a tighter form of organization was left to the formerly independent en- 
tities retaining influence within the new firm. In such holding companies, ac- 
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inevitably clash and dire confusion results” (1907, 16-17).  As a result, internal 
conflict prevented many British firms from adopting a more efficient manageri- 
ally centralized structure through tighter merger (Freyer 1992, 39). As Hannah 
concluded, the British turn-of-the-century merger wave was an important eco- 
nomic innovation, but the “industrial partnership and the family-owned factory 
remained the typical  unit in most branches of  manufacturing.”  Legal  forms 
such as the holding company, “which strengthened tendencies to large scale, 
had also given a new lease of life to smaller businesses. Partnerships and fam- 
ily firms adopted the new institutional form to their own purpose.” As a result, 
the  “separation  and  professionalization  of  management”  associated  with 
“modern corporations still had a long way to develop” (Hannah 1983,23-24). 
As Bonbright and Means noted, this was not the case in America. The law’s 
coincident criminalization of cartel practices and tolerance of tighter forms of 
corporate consolidation encouraged greater managerial  centralization within 
larger corporations. The emerging per se rule against cartels combined with the 
abolition of the trust and the enactment of holding company laws undoubtedly 
fostered adoption of the holding company during the merger wave. Similarly, 
the Northern Securities decision of  1903, in which the Supreme Court for the 
first time held that holding companies were subject to prosecution,  spurred 
managers to resort to tighter forms of corporate consolidation in order to avoid 
such suits. Moreover, once the Court established the rule of reason in Standard 
Oil (1911), the principle was applied to favor tighter corporate structures over 
looser ones. 
The rule of reason proved to  be  sufficiently  flexible that a wide range of 
tight corporate structures could withstand legal challenge. According to Chief 
Justice White’s formulation, the test of reasonableness was grounded on con- 
duct. Thus the predatory pricing practices of Standard Oil and American To- 
bacco were found to be unreasonable and therefore illegal. U.S. Steel, however, 
although the world’s largest corporation, did not use its market power “unrea- 
sonably,” and therefore the Court held that it had not violated the antitrust laws 
(Freyer 1992; Chandler 1988, 363-64). 
Unlike British  law, therefore, American antitrust hedged the holding com- 
pany within ambiguous but nonetheless real limits. The central consideration 
determining whether  a court would resolve the ambiguity for or against the 
legitimacy of  the holding company depended on whether it found the firm’s 
conduct  to  be  reasonable.  At  the  threshold,  however,  the  question  arose 
whether a third party-the  Justice Department, a state attorney general, or, in 
a private suit, some plaintiff business-had  reason to challenge such conduct. 
As Bonbright and Means suggested, the facts of  a particular  case influenced 
both the initial decision to sue and the suit’s eventual outcome. Nevertheless, 
the tighter the corporate structure, the greater was the likelihood that the defen- 
dant corporation would prevail. 
Thus the question was, why were tighter corporate structures more immune 
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corporation was entirely the creature of state law. Accordingly, in acquiring the 
assets of other firms through merger, the new entity possessed the legitimacy 
conferred by the state in the original charter. Under the rule of reason a cause 
of action existed against such a firm if a link between its internal operational 
character and pernicious conduct could be proven. Establishing such a link was 
difficult, however, because the states’ corporate law gave management consid- 
erable legal freedom over the firm’s operation. The more extensive was man- 
agement’s direct control of the operational parts of the firm, the harder it was 
to  prove criminal culpability. Thus the  organizational reason why  a tighter 
merger increased the firm’s protection from antitrust challenge was that such a 
structure resulted in more extensive managerial ~entra1ization.l~ 
Yet  managerial centralization was only part of the answer. If a third party 
could prove that management’s decisions had led to “unreasonable” conduct, 
the firm had violated the antitrust laws. The broader benefit that such central- 
ization of operational control brought was that it minimized incentives to resort 
to “unreasonable” conduct.I5 The problem with the holding company was that 
its level of  managerial  centralization was often inadequate to “coordinate the 
day-to-day  activities  of  a large number of plants because  the central office 
could not effectively regulate the flow of products. Indeed, single plants could 
adapt more easily to changes in supply and demand” (Fligstein 1990, 26; see 
also Lamoreaux  1985). As a result, firms such as Standard Oil and American 
Tobacco sought greater organizational control through tighter combination, in- 
tegrating backward into production-related processes and forward into market- 
ing. Even so, the uncertainty resulting first from the Northern Securities case 
and then the flexibility inherent in the rule of  reason enmeshed antitrust en- 
forcement  in  sufficient  legal  ambiguity  that  attaining tighter organizational 
structure sometimes did not remove internal exigencies resulting in what could 
be proven to be unreasonable conduct. The level of market domination that 
resulted  from greater organizational concentration thus in some cases led to 
predatory pricing practices and divisions of market territories that aroused op- 
position  from middlemen, and ultimately  competitors,  which in turn  led to 
government prosecution. Once it became clear that the judiciary would apply 
the rule of reason against such practices, firms were encouraged  to acquire 
greater managerial control over the process of  production, leading to, as in 
the case of  U.S. Steel, increased scale, but market and pricing strategies that 
nonetheless did not offend competitors and other participants in the industry.I6 
Of course, the formation of a tighter merger required the consent of stock- 
holders.  In Britain former owner-operators  of  firms who combined to form 
such large holding companies as Imperial Tobacco continued to exercise con- 
siderable influence within the corporation. These individuals, and the stock- 
14. Chandler 1977, 333-34,499,  500; Fligstein 1990.24-26;  Freyer 1992, 20-42;  1979. 
15. Freyer 1992, 35-42,  132-41;  Fligstein 1990.24-26;  Bonbright and Means 1932. 
16. Chandler 1977, 333-34,  499, 500;  Fligstein  1990, 24-26;  Freyer 1992, 20-42;  1979; La- 
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holders identified with them, formed a powerful interest capable of blocking 
greater managerial centralization attained through tighter merger. In America 
such groups undoubtedly existed. The difference, however, was that directors 
operated within a legal environment in which the tighter the corporate structure 
the greater was the possibility of avoiding an antitrust suit. Accordingly, direc- 
tors could, as Bonbright and Means noted, use the threat or reality of legal 
prosecution to justify the need to choose the tighter merger and the increased 
managerial centralization it required. 
Finally, the interplay between law and small business influenced the move- 
ment toward tighter corporate forms in another way as well. In Britain the law 
governing cartels and the holding-company  statute permitted  small firms to 
survive and even thrive. Louis Brandeis and others predicted that the American 
judiciary’s refusal to apply the rule of reason to cartel practices would foster 
corporate consolidation and the demise of  small firms. If the Court reversed 
this policy and followed British doctrine allowing the enforcement of loose 
agreements, Brandeis argued, small businesses might enjoy scale and organi- 
zational economies  and still preserve  their independence.  If  the  British ex- 
ample was any indication, this policy reversal would  also have reduced the 
incentive for third-party suits in cases involving managerially centralized firms 
because it would have limited the sort of conduct that was held to be unreason- 
able and therefore illegal. In either case, enforcement of Brandeis’s idea would 
generally have depoliticized small business and reduced the political and sym- 
bolic significance of antitrust. Ironically, however, the result might have been 
to impede the triumph  of  the  managerial revolution  that contributed to the 
dominance of the American economy throughout the twentieth century (Freyer 
1992,66-67). 
6.5  Conclusion 
The rise of big business thus engendered a divergent response from British 
and American lawmakers. Prior to the 1880s, neither nation’s courts generally 
enforced the  restrictive  practices  businessmen established.  Yet  by  the early 
1890s British and American courts were called upon to decide the legality of 
new business structures. In Britain, the Mogul case condoned but did not en- 
force a sophisticated system of self-regulating cartel practices. A few years 
later in Nordenfelt the House of Lords established “reasonableness” as the gen- 
eral rule governing the enforcement of restrictive  practices arising from the 
changing economy. The self-restraint these  and subsequent decisions repre- 
sented provided a legal framework for the perpetuation of family enterprise. It 
also helped to explain the  smaller (compared to the United  States) turn-of- 
17. Chandler 1977, 333-34,  499, 500; Fligstcin 1990, 24-26;  Freyer  1992, 26-42;  1979; La- 
moreaux 1985; Bonbright and Means 1932; Chandler 1990, 288, 296, 303, 311, 312, 320, 370, 
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the-century  merger wave and the corresponding underdevelopment  of  large, 
managerially centralized corporations. 
The difference in American business and law was noteworthy. During the 
1880s the inability  to enforce cartel  agreements encouraged businessmen 
to adopt Dodd’s trust device. Most states responded by revising their laws to 
make restrictive trade agreements, including both cartels and trusts, not only 
unenforceable but also subject to prosecution as illegal. At the same time, how- 
ever, New Jersey and other states permitted  firms to adopt a tighter form of 
corporate structure, the holding company. In a series of decisions stretching 
from Knight and the anticartel cases of the 1890s to Northern Securities of 
1903 and the cases establishing the rule of reason in 191  I, the Supreme Court’s 
construction of  the Sherman Antitrust Act signaled that the tighter the form of 
organization, the less likely a combination was to be dissolved. Unlike their 
British counterparts, then, American businessmen  during the turn of the cen- 
tury considered merger issues not solely in investment terms, but also as the 
safest means of avoiding government prosecution. Market factors undoubtedly 
influenced the great merger wave in both nations. But given the otherwise simi- 
lar technological  and industrial  development  of the two countries,  a salient 
difference was the presence or lack of antitrust. 
Comparing British  and American business  structures provides a basis for 
measuring the broader impact of antitrust. The principle of freedom of contract 
to which British courts adhered  in applying their rule of  reason reflected  a 
preference for the invisible hand of the market, whereas the ambivalent inter- 
pretations of  the Sherman Act, culminating  in the  Supreme Court’s rule of 
reason,  demonstrated  American  confidence  in  the  visible  hand  of  the law- 
maker. These divergent views of government intervention in the economic or- 
der grew out of different social relations and political conflicts in the two na- 
tions.  There may  have  been  inconsistencies  and failures in  the  American 
antitrust experience. Yet in the long run, antitrust benefited consumers by en- 
couraging  the more efficient production  of  goods managerial  centralization 
made possible. Ironically, antitrust thus achieved consumer welfare by its fail- 
ure to limit the spread of corporate bigness. 
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Comment  Victor P.  Goldberg 
This  paper  presents,  but  does  not  satisfactorily  resolve,  a paradox.  Alfred 
Chandler has argued that in the three or four decades around the turn of  the 
century the United States and England developed different ways of organizing 
business and that these differences resulted largely from differences in the le- 
gal regimes. I think it is possible to make that argument, but it will not be easy. 
The basic features of the American argument are well known. The antitrust 
laws were generally perceived to be hostile to restraints between firms-price 
fixing, market division, and so forth. At the same time, consolidations (which 
facilitated coordination within organizations) were  viewed  with  more equa- 
nimity. The classic example is the legal fate of the Addyston Pipe conspirators. 
Their cartel behavior  was treated as a per se violation  of  the Sherman Act, 
which subjected them to criminal penalties and treble damages; their merger 
while the criminal prosecution was proceeding, however, was not even chal- 
lenged. The different legal response contributed, so it is argued, to the great 
merger wave at the turn of the century and to the emergence of the large mana- 
gerially controlled firm as the dominant form of organization for American in- 
dustry. 
At the same time, the British policy  toward restraints of trade was more 
lenient. When the restraints were not explicitly approved by  the courts, they 
were held merely to be not legal rather than illegal. That is, price fixers would 
not be penalized; they just would not be able to rely on the courts to enforce 
their agreements. By treating cartels and consolidations in a more even-handed 
fashion, the legal regime did not tilt British industry toward merger and consol- 
idation. The British merger wave was smaller, and the dominant form of organ- 
ization was the holding company, which generally remained a loose confedera- 
tion of formally independent family firms. 
Thus, both countries began the period with an industrial structure dominated 
by  small firms, but they responded differently to the changing technological 
constraints. England, relatively unconstrained by the law, chose the loose con- 
federations;  the United  States, subjected to more binding  legal  constraints, 
chose consolidation. And herein lies the paradox. Why would the constrained 
choice (American) result in a more efficient outcome than the unconstrained 
choice (British)? One should think, ceteris paribus, that broadening the choice 
set would make it more likely that the most efficient regime would be chosen. 
If, as Freyer argues, the American organizational form was superior to the Brit- 
ish, then why did more choice result in the survival of the unfittest? 
There are a number of ways out. First, Chandler’s starting point could be 
wrong. It might well turn out that the technological constraints in the two coun- 
tries were sufficiently different so that the outcomes in both  countries were 
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efficient-the  legal constraints didn’t much matter. I suspect that there’s some 
truth to this. Second, Freyer might have been mistaken. The British  solution 
might have been the most efficient-the  legal constraints forced the Americans 
to adopt an inferior organizational technology. Doubtful. Third, it might be 
possible to tell  some sort of “path dependence”  story-what  made sense at 
time t leads to an inferior outcome at time f + 1 and it is now too difficult to 
change. I think that there might be something to this, but some real work is 
necessary to make the argument fly. 
Path dependence has been on somewhat shaky ground since the debunking 
of everybody’s favorite example, the QWERTY keyboard (Liebowitz and Mar- 
golis 1990). I think that the American failure to adopt the metric system and 
the Japanese failure to adopt a more computer-friendly language suggest that 
some vitality remains. In the present context, it is plausible that reasonable 
businessmen circa 1900 could have opted for the loose cartel rather than con- 
solidation. (Recall that a large proportion of the American mergers failed.) But 
why  would the English  stick with the inferior organizational technology? I 
suspect that a satisfactory answer would require most of the following: weak 
international competition (inefficient firms can survive); a thin supply of entre- 
preneurs willing to introduce new organizational forms; a thin supply of capi- 
talists willing and able to finance the new forms; the emergence of supporting 
institutions (lawyers, accountants, banks) well suited to serving the loose car- 
tels but not for supporting larger organizations (so the relative costs of the two 
organizational forms would evolve differently in America  and Britain); and 
legal doctrines that enabled minority  shareholders to make life more difficult 
for the majority (perhaps adopted at the behest of the loose cartels to impede 
the potential competitors). If we are to rescue Chandler’s story and resolve the 
paradox,  then  the  preceding  laundry  list  suggests the  appropriate  research 
agenda.’ 
Freyer has, I believe, overstated the differences between the American and 
British case in two dimensions. First, while it is true that agreements that were 
acceptable in England were criminal violations in the United States, the threat 
of criminal prosecution in the United States in this era was remote.* It is hard 
to accept Freyer’s implication that the criminalization  of  American  antitrust 
mattered. Second, Dr.  Miles Medical Co. v. Park and Sons Co. (220 US. 373 
1. My colleague, Mark Roe, argues that the repeated fragmentation of American financial insti- 
tutions influenced the evolution of the large American public corporation, giving managers consid- 
erably more control than they would have had otherwise. See, for example, Roe 1994. He suggests 
that efficiency effects might have been quite modest, partly because of other adaptations; now 
that the efficiency consequences seem to be more severe, we observe more efforts to reverse the 
evolutionary path. That is, while the form might display considerable path dependence, the conse- 
quences (in terms of efficiency) might be muted. This kind of efficiency spin on the path depen- 
dence story might carry over to Freyer’s problem as well. 
2.  See Posner  1970. Of  the six criminal prosecutions in  1890-1904.  only one resulted  in a 
conviction. Aside from labor cases, no one went to jail prior to 1930 (391). 205  Legal Restraints on Economic Coordination 
[ 191  I]) almost certainly  had  less  impact on behavior  than  Freyer  suggests. 
True, the vertical price restriction was technically unlawful. Still, the relation- 
ship between drug manufacturers, wholesalers, and retailers remained essen- 
tially unchanged in the quarter century following Dr.  Miles. The changes that 
did finally come had little to do with changes in the legal regime; they had 
more to do with the diffusion of the automobile, radio, and television and the 
concomitant changes in retailing. 
I want to make one more point about Freyer’s paper. He has performed a 
useful function by reframing the questions about the origins of American anti- 
trust policy. Too often, the debate is framed in terms of  Robert Bork’s claim 
that the goal of  the Sherman Act is consumer welfare. But, as Freyer makes 
clear, whatever  the motives  of  Senator Sherman and his supporters, the act 
itself is only a piece of  the story. There is a mix of federal and state statutes 
and common-law doctrines dealing with questions that would now be labeled 
restraints  of trade or antitrust, but also including matters that would now be 
included under the corporation-law rubric. This amalgam of rules reflected 
protectionist (especially from out-of-state competition) and populist responses 
to a changing world in which there were increased advantages from coopera- 
tion  (both for achieving efficiency  and for collecting monopoly rents). The 
paper gives us a sketch of what this more complex background looks like; it 
provides  a nice advertisement for the book from which it is derived (Freyer 
1992). 
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